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DENIAL OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS IN THE PRETRIAL DETENTION
OF JUVENILES
I. INTRODUCTION
Should juveniles be afforded the same guarantee as
adults to a judicial determination of probable cause within
forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest?1 Not in California,
according to the California Supreme Court. In Alfredo A. v.
Superior Court,2 the California Supreme Court held that the
forty-eight hour rule does not apply to juveniles.3 This deci-
sion marked a departure from the 1991 United States
Supreme Court decision of County of Riverside v. McLaugh-
lin,' which provided "individuals" the right to a probable
cause determination within forty-eight hours of a warrantless
arrest.5
The juvenile criminal justice system can be distinguished
from the adult criminal justice system. The disparity be-
tween systems is quite obvious in that different statutes in
different code sections govern a suspect's adjudication.6 Both
of these systems, however, are based on the same common
law tradition upon which this country's Constitution and ac-
companying Bill of Rights are founded. Although the Bill of
Rights provides individual protections to "the people,"7 courts
have held, in some circumstances, that juveniles are not to be
considered part of "the people."" In effect, this means that
constitutional protections granted in the Bill of Rights are not
to be extended to juveniles.9 In other circumstances, adults
and juveniles are treated equally. 10 Disparate treatment 1
1. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
2. 865 P.2d 56 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994).
3. Id. at 71.
4. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
5. Id. at 56-57.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 681-1567 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (governing an
adult's adjudication); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 200-945 (West 1987 & Supp.
1994) (providing for a juvenile's adjudication).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
8. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
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results from the judiciary's balancing of societal interests
against the liberty interests of the individual.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has articulated and
refined the protections against unreasonable seizures of the
person. Currently, one of the Fourth Amendment protections
is the requirement of a judicial determination of probable
cause within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest. 12 The
key United States Supreme Court cases addressing this issue
neither limit their holdings to adults, nor are they specifically
inclusive of juveniles. 13
This comment examines whether juveniles should be ex-
tended the same constitutional guarantee as adults to a judi-
cial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours
of a warrantless arrest by analyzing the California Supreme
Court's holding in Alfredo A v. Superior Court.14 This com-
ment begins by reviewing the court's recognition and develop-
ment of a constitutionally protected right to a prompt show-
ing of probable cause following a warrantless arrest in
Gerstein v. Pugh15 and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. 6
The relevant statutes governing California's juvenile system
will also be examined. 17 This comment then analyzes the Al-
fredo A. decision and concludes that Chief Justice Lucas' lead
decision' 8 misapplies precedent and fails to justify its holding
on Fourth Amendment grounds. In addition, Alfredo A. fails
to adequately acknowledge the negative aspects of juvenile
detention.
This comment proposes that the same standard be ap-
plied to juveniles and adults, and that the law require a judi-
cial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours
of a warrantless arrest to justify further detention of a juve-
11. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
12. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
13. See infra notes 127, 130 and accompanying text.
14. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
86 (1994).
15. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
16. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 44.
17. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601-638 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
18. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the opinion of the court in which Justices
Panelli and Baxter concurred. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994). Justice Arabian wrote a separate concur-
rence, providing different legal arguments for the result. Id. Justices Kennard
and George joined in a dissent written by Justice Mosk. Id. Justice George also
submitted a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
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nile suspect. 19 Such a result could be achieved through a ju-
dicial decision.20 Alternatively, statutory reform could be
successfully employed by narrowing the scope of potential ju-
venile detainees to: 1) the truly dangerous; 2) those who have
escaped from a facility to which they had been previously sen-
tenced; 3) those who are likely to flee the jurisdiction; and 4)
those who are verified to be fugitives from another jurisdic-
tion and whose return has been requested.2 '
A. The Standard of Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons
... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.22
The underlying purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
forbid unwarranted intrusions through exploratory searches
and seizures by the government.23 Perhaps the greatest of
intrusions against which the Fourth Amendment protects oc-
curs when an unwarranted arrest and detainment deprives
one of his freedom of liberty.24
Standards for arrest and detainment have been derived
from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law anteced-
ents.2 5 The Supreme Court has defined the standard for
arrest as being the presence of probable cause.26 Probable
cause has been defined in terms of facts and circumstances
"sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."2 7
Much like the standard for searches and seizures, this stan-
dard "represents a necessary accommodation between the in-
19. See infra part V.
20. See infra part V.A.
21. See infra part V.B.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
25. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975).
26. Id.
27. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
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dividual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control
"28crime.
B. Gerstein v. Pugh
The focus of recent analysis regarding the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures of the
person stems from the 1975 decision of Gerstein v. Pugh.2 9
Through this decision, the United States Supreme Court
sought to clarify what constituted proper procedures for
probable cause determinations following a warrantless
arrest.3 °
1. The Legal Landscape in Florida
In Gerstein, respondents Pugh and Henderson were ar-
rested and detained for thirteen and seventeen days, respec-
tively, charged under a prosecutor's information.3 ' Under
Florida law, prosecutors were allowed to charge all crimes by
information without obtaining leave of the court, with the ex-
ception of capital offenses.32 Furthermore, Florida courts had
held that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's
right to a preliminary hearing to test for probable cause, and
a writ of habeas corpus could not be used "except perhaps in
exceptional circumstances" to test for probable cause for de-
tainment.33 The only way for one arrested without a warrant
to obtain a judicial determination of probable cause was
through either a statute allowing for a preliminary hearing
28. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112. "The rule of probable cause is a practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating the often opposing interests of the individual's privacy and law
enforcement's need to fight crime." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949).
29. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 103.
30. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). Gerstein addressed the fol-
lowing two questions: whether a person arrested and held for trial is entitled to
a judicial determination of probable cause to warrant detention, and if so,
whether an adversarial hearing is constitutionally required. Id.
31. Id. at 105. An information is used in place of a grand jury indictment to
bring a person to trial. BLAies LAw DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990).
32. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105.
33. Id. at 106. The writ was allowed only in exceptional circumstances to
prevent them from being used for "fishing expeditions" to discover the state's
evidence, and to ensure the orderly course of administration of the criminal law
system. Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1951).
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after thirty days, or arraignment, which often was delayed for
a month or longer.3 4
2. Gerstein's Holding
Respondents argued that there existed a constitutional
right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause for
pretrial restraint on liberty.35 The Supreme Court agreed,
holding, "the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
detention."3
6
The Court reached a "practical compromise" in balancing
law enforcement needs to make warrantless arrests with the
individual's liberty interest in granting the right to a prob-
able cause determination. 7 First, the Court recognized the
need for a neutral and detached magistrate to rule on prob-
able cause to effectuate, properly, the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.38  Although maximum protection of the
individual's rights would be guaranteed by requiring judicial
review of factual circumstances prior to all arrests, this
would have a crippling effect on legitimate law enforce-
ment.39 In addition, the Court had never invalidated an
arrest supported by probable cause simply because the of-
ficers failed to secure a warrant.
40
Ultimately, the Court was persuaded to grant the prob-
able cause determination because of the significant, serious
consequences resulting from prolonged detention. The Court
clearly stated its position as follows:
Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that
justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment
evaporate. There no longer is any danger that the suspect
will escape or commit further crimes while the police sub-
mit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's
reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's
need for a neutral determination of probable cause in-
34. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106 (1975).
35. Id. at 106-07.
36. Id. at 126.
37. Id. at 113-14.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975). The added time required to
secure a warrant would delay law enforcement's response time to crime scenes
where they anticipated making arrests. Furthermore, law enforcement would
be unable to make arrests resulting from unfolding criminal activity.
40. Id. at 113.
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creases significantly. The consequences of prolonged de-
tention may be more serious than the interference occa-
sioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the
suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair
his family relationships.... When the stakes are this
high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is es-
sential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful
protection from unfounded interference with liberty.4 1
The Gerstein Court, however, did not hold that the
Fourth Amendment demanded an adversarial proceeding to
fulfill its constitutional requirements.42 As a result of the
lesser consequences involved and the nature of the proceed-
ing, the Court concluded that a less formal procedure than an
adversarial proceeding was justified for the judicial determi-
nation of probable cause.48
The Court declined to rule on any specific time parame-
ters or procedures which would be required to fulfill its dic-
tate of a "prompt" judicial determination of probable cause."
Instead, the Court left these issues to be resolved by the
states. 45 Sixteen years after Gerstein, the need for Court
clarification as to what Gerstein required became evident, as
lower courts were defining Gerstein's promptness mandate in
a variety of conflicting ways.46
C. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
The question of what constituted a "prompt" judicial de-
termination of probable cause served as the focus of the 1991
41. Id. at 114 (citation omitted). The Court also found historical support for
its holding, noting "[alt common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an
arrested person to be brought before a justice of the peace shortly after arrest."
Id. at 116.
42. Id. at 126-27.
43. Id. at 121. The Court also expressed concern that requiring adversarial
proceedings would exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay. Id. at 122 n.23.
44. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975).
45. Id. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted: "[tlhere is no single
preferred pretrial procedure, and the nature of the probable cause determina-
tion usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial procedure viewed as
a whole.... [W]e recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation
by the States." Id.
46. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits interpreted Gerstein as requir-
ing a probable cause determination immediately following completion of the ad-
ministrative procedures incident to arrest. In contrast, the Second Circuit un-
derstood Gerstein to permit states to combine probable cause determinations
with other pretrial proceedings. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 50 (1991).
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decision of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin."' In the years
following Gerstein, circuit courts interpreted the require-
ments of Gerstein in an inconsistent manner.48 The conflict
in the circuit courts resulted in "a flurry of systemic chal-
lenges to city and county practices, putting federal judges in
the role of making legislative judgments and overseeing local
[jail-house] operations."49 To provide guidance to the lower
courts, the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule in
McLaughlin, holding that jurisdictions that provide judicial
determinations of probable cause within forty-eight hours of
arrest would, as a general matter, comply with Gerstein's
promptness requirement.5 °
1. Background in McLaughlin
In August 1987, Donald McLaughlin filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California alleging that after being arrested without a war-
rant and incarcerated, Riverside County denied him a prob-
able cause determination.51 The existing policy of the County
provided for the determination of probable cause at the ar-
raignment proceeding, which was to be conducted "without
unnecessary delay" and, in any event, within two days of
arrest, excluding weekends and holidays.52
For those people arrested late in the week, the County's
policy could result in prolonged detentions prior to any show-
ing of probable cause.53 The district court held that the pol-
icy of the County violated the promptness requirement of
Gerstein, and issued an injunction requiring the County to
hold a probable cause hearing within thirty-six hours of a
warrantless arrest.54 The County appealed the decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
which subsequently affirmed the district court's decision.55
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that no more than thirty-six
hours were needed to "complete the administrative steps inci-
47. Id. at 50.
48. Id.; see supra note 46.
49. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
50. Id.
51. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 48 (1991).
52. Id. at 47.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id. at 50.
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dent to arrest," and once those steps were completed, a show-
ing of probable cause was required to further detain a
suspect.56
2. O'Connor's Majority: Probable Cause Determination
Within Forty-Eight Hours
As a result of the circuit courts' conflicting interpreta-
tions of Gerstein's promptness requirement,57 the United
States Supreme Court granted McLaughlin certiorari. 5s Jus-
tice O'Connor authored the 5-4 majority decision in which the
Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and held
that probable cause determinations occurring within forty-
eight hours following a warrantless arrest, inclusive of week-
ends and holidays, were constitutionally permissible.
59
Justice O'Connor urged that Gerstein did not require an
immediate determination of probable cause.6 0 Rather, Ger-
stein required a prompt determination of probable cause.6 '
O'Connor cited the need for states to retain flexibility in their
pretrial procedures in determining that forty-eight hours was
a proper amount of time to meet the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.62  Here, O'Connor pronounced the
following:
Inherent in Gerstein's invitation to the States to experi-
ment and adapt was the recognition that the Fourth
Amendment does not compel an immediate determination
of probable cause upon completing the administrative
steps incident to arrest. Plainly, if a probable cause hear-
ing is compelled the moment a suspect is finished being
"booked," there is no room whatsoever for "flexibility and
experimentation by the States."63
O'Connor recognized that Gerstein did not constitute a
"blank check" to the states and that Gerstein did limit the
permissible amount of time that an individual may be de-
56. Country of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 50 (1991).
57. See supra note 46.
58. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 50.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 53. O'Connor interpreted the Fourth Amendment to permit rea-
sonable postponements of probable cause determinations that result from police
processing suspects through an overburdened criminal justice system. Id. at 55.
61. Country of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 53-54.
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tained prior to a showing of probable cause.6 4 In defining
Gerstein's promptness requirement at forty-eight hours,
O'Connor recognized that the Fourth Amendment "contem-
plated a reasonable accommodation between the legitimate
competing concerns" of the rights of individuals and the reali-
ties of law enforcement."
65
3. Marshall's Dissent: Probable Cause Determination
Within Thirty-Six Hours
Justice Marshall dissented, urging affirmance of the
Ninth Circuit's holding of a required showing of probable
cause within thirty-six hours of a warrantless arrest.6 Mar-
shall asserted that a probable cause hearing is sufficiently
prompt under Gerstein only when provided immediately upon
completion of the steps incident to arrest.
67
4. Scalia's Dissent: Probable Cause Determination
Within Twenty-Four Hours
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the ma-
jority of the Court had strayed from the standard of reasona-
bleness in its analysis. 68 Scalia maintained that one of the
most important protections found at common law against an
unreasonable seizure of the person was that a person arrest-
ing a suspect without a warrant must take the suspect before
a magistrate as soon as is reasonably possible.6 9 According to
Scalia, the only factor bearing on the reasonableness of the
delay was "not such circumstances as the pressing need to
conduct further investigation, but the arresting officer's abil-
ity, once the prisoner has been secured, to reach a magistrate
who could issue the needed warrant for further detention."70
64. Id. at 55.
65. Id. at 57-58. The Court's "reasonable accomodation" reflected the same
considerations as the "practical compromise" discussed by the Gerstein Court.
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
66. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 60-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia noted that the "practical
compromise" reached by the majority was inappropriate, as the reasonableness
standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment already encompassed a balancing
of interests. The reasonableness standard was a clear and well-adhered to prin-
ciple, in place since 1791, and preserved in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 60.
69. Id. at 60-61.
70. Id. at 61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Although Scalia did not interpret Gerstein to require an im-
mediate determination of probable cause, he believed the de-
lay could not be attributed to something other than complet-
ing the administrative steps incident to arrest and arranging
for an available magistrate. 7 '
Scalia determined that the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable seizures would be violated if a probable
cause determination following a warrantless arrest was
delayed either, "1) for reasons unrelated to arrangement of
the probable-cause determination or completion of the steps
incident to arrest, or 2) beyond 24 hours after the arrest."
72
Scalia based the twenty-four hour standard on federal and
state court holdings, the American Bar Association and
American Law Institute's recommendations, and the writings
of legal scholars.73
D. The California Juvenile System and its Governing
Statutes
The parens patriae doctrine exists at the core of the phi-
losophy of the juvenile court system. 4 Parens patriae in the
juvenile system refers to the role of a state as sovereign and
guardian acting on behalf of children when the parents of the
child are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsi-
bilities, or when the child poses a community crime prob-
lem. 75 The doctrine's two goals are to provide guidance and
rehabilitation for the child, and to provide protection for
society.76
The Welfare and Institutions Code governs the juvenile
criminal justice system in California, and details the State's
parens patriae role.7 7 A brief overview of the Welfare & Insti-
tution Code reveals that its statutory provisions allow for
71. Country of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 63-64 (1991). Scalia
argued that the administrative convenience of combining the probable cause
hearing with other pretrial procedures was not grounds for warranting deten-
tion of a possibly innocent person. Id. at 64.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Id. at 68-70.
74. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure
for the Criminal Court, 69 MNN. L. REV. 141, 148 (1984); Claudia Worrell, Pre-
trial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked by the Parens
Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 175 (1985).
75. Worrell, supra note 74, at 175.
76. Id.
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601-638 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
[Vol. 35698
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pretrial detentions in excess of forty-eight hours.78 Under the
California juvenile criminal justice system, a peace officer
may, without a warrant, take a minor into custody if the of-
ficer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has vio-
lated the law. 79 When a minor is arrested and detained on
suspicion of having committed a crime, the minor is not for-
mally charged with a crime, as would be a similarly situated
adult.8 0 Instead, the officer's discretion governs the decision
of whether to release the minor or continue to hold him in
custody."'
To guide the officer in determining which disposition of
the minor is most appropriate, section 626 states, "the officer
shall prefer the alternative which least restricts the minor's
freedom of movement, provided that alternative is compati-
ble with the best interests of the minor and the commu-
nity."82 In the event the minor is held in custody, the officer
must "take immediate steps to notify the minor's parent,
guardian, or responsible relative that such minor is in cus-
tody and the place where he is being held."83 Section 628
lists the criteria a probation officer must consider when deter-
mining whether a minor should be detained pending a prob-
able cause hearing.8 4
78. Id.
79. Id. §§ 602, 625. Section 602 states:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any
law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or
county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establish-
ing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
Id. § 602. Section 625 provides, in part, that, "[a] peace officer may, without a
warrant, take into temporary custody a minor: (a) Who is under the age of 18
years when such officer has reasonable cause for believing that such minor is a
person described in Section ... 602." Id. § 625.
80. Id. § 626.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 627(a).
84. Id. § 628. Section 628(a) states:
Upon delivery to the probation officer of a minor who has been
taken into temporary custody under the provisions of this article, the
probation officer shall immediately investigate the circumstances of
the minor and the facts surrounding his being taken into custody and
shall immediately release such minor to the custody of his parent,
guardian, or responsible relative unless one or more of the following
conditions exist: (1) The minor is in need of proper and effective paren-
tal care or control and has no parent, guardian, or responsible relative;
or has no parent, guardian, or responsible relative willing to exercise
6991995]
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A minor taken into custody must be released within
forty-eight hours, excluding non-judicial days,"5 unless the
prosecuting attorney files a wardship petition pursuant to
section 602,86 and a judge or referee of the juvenile court or-
ders the minor to be detained pursuant to section 635.87 If a
wardship petition is filed, section 632(a) provides that the mi-
nor shall:
as soon as possible but in any event before the expiration
of the next judicial day after a petition to declare the mi-
nor a ward or dependent child has been filed, be brought
before a judge or referee of the juvenile court for a hearing
to determine whether the minor shall be further detained.
or capable of exercising such care or control; or has no parent, guard-
ian, or responsible relative actually exercising such care or control. (2)
The minor is destitute or is not provided with the necessities of life or
is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode. (3) The minor is
provided with a home which is an unfit place for him by reason of ne-
glect, cruelty, depravity or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of
his guardian or other person in whose custody or care he is. (4) Contin-
ued detention of the minor is a matter of immediate and urgent neces-
sity for the protection of the minor or reasonable necessity for the pro-
tection of the person or property of another. (5) The minor is likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court. (6) The minor has violated an order of
the juvenile court. (7) The minor is physically dangerous to the public
because of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
Id. § 628(a).
85. Non-judicial days are days when courts are not open for judicial busi-
ness as defined in section 134 of California Code of Civil Procedure. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 134 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
86. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 631(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
87. Id. §§ 631(b), 635. Section 635 details under what circumstances a mi-
nor should be released or further detained. It states:
The court will examine such minor, his parent, guardian, or other
person having relevant knowledge, hear such relevant evidence as the
minor, his parent or guardian or their counsel desires to present, and,
unless it appears that the minor has violated an order of the juvenile
court or has escaped from the commitment of the juvenile court or that
it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of
such minor or reasonably necessary for the protection of the person or
property of another that he be detained or that such minor is likely to
flee to avoid the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall make its order
releasing such minor from custody. The circumstances and gravity of
the alleged offense may be considered, in conjunction with other fac-
tors, to determine whether it is a matter of immediate and urgent ne-
cessity for the protection of the minor or reasonably necessary for the
protection of the person or property of another that the minor be
detained.
Id. § 635.
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Such a hearing shall be referred to as a "detention
hearing."88
Because a petition need not be filed until forty-eight
hours after the arrest,8 9 and the minor need not be brought
before the court for a hearing to determine probable cause
until the first judicial day after the petition is filed,90 a juve-
nile could be held in custody without a showing of probable
cause for a period of time in excess of forty-eight hours. The
governing statutes, therefore, allow for potential conflicts
with the forty-eight hour rule stated in McLaughlin.91 Such
a conflict occurred in Alfredo A., where the California
Supreme Court ruled on whether the McLaughlin standard
applied to juveniles. 92
E. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court
1. Factual and Procedural Background
Alfredo A., a minor, was arrested on July 24, 1991, and
taken into custody without a warrant on suspicion of having
possessed cocaine base for sale.93 The following day, Alfredo
A. filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Appellate District seeking his imme-
diate release.94 The petition alleged that:
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, petitioner is entitled to a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause for his continued detention within
48 hours of his arrest. No such judicial determination has
been made, and no determination will be made within the
48 hour period. This is because the Los Angeles County
Superior Court, Juvenile Court, has adopted as its 'official
position' that a juvenile is not entitled to such a prompt
probable cause determination.95
88. Id. § 632(a).
89. Id. § 631(a).
90. Id. § 632(a).
91. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).
92. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
86 (1994).
93. Id. at 59. Alfredo A. was taken into custody pursuant to sections 602
and 625 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Shortly after McLaughlin was decided, the presiding judge of the
Los Angeles County Juvenile Court sent a memorandum to all juvenile court
judges, commissioners, and referees indicating the "official position" of the Los
Angeles County Juvenile Court to be that McLaughlin's forty-eight hour rule
7011995]
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On that same day, the prosecuting attorney filed a ward-
ship petition in the juvenile court alleging that Alfredo A.
came within the provisions of section 60296 by violating
Health and Safety Code sections 11351 and 11351.5. 97 Three
days later, on the next "judicial day," Alfredo A. appeared in
court. Alfredo A.'s probation officer, however, failed to pro-
vide a detention report to the court in preparation for the de-
tention hearing and, as a result, the court ordered Alfredo
A.'s release.98
Although petitioner Alfredo A. acknowledged that his re-
lease from custody rendered his petition moot as to him, the
Court of Appeals decided to hear his mandamus petition.99
The Court of Appeals held the County's process to be consti-
tutional based on the following reasoning:
[The] statutes provide procedural safeguards that accom-
modate the individual's right to liberty and the state's
duty to control crime. They reflect the balance that must
be struck between the informality and flexibility of juve-
nile proceedings even as they comport with the fundamen-
tal fairness required by due process. The statutory
scheme protects a minor's right to freedom, consistent
with the state interest in protecting the minor and
society.100
Counsel for Alfredo A. petitioned the California Supreme
Court for review of the appellate court decision arguing that
his client's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.10 '
did not apply in juvenile court proceedings. This position was based on an opin-
ion furnished by county counsel, who had based its conclusion on the reasoning
found in the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court case Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253
(1984). Id. See infra text accompanying notes 104-09 for a discussion of Schall.
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11351, 11351.5 (West 1991 & Supp.
1993) (proscribing the possession of controlled substances and, specifically, co-
caine base for sale).
98. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 59 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994). The detention report is a summary of the findings made by the
probation officer regarding the juvenile's case which details whether or not the
probation officer has found facts upon which it can be based that there is prob-
able cause to believe the suspect has committed the offense in question. See
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 626.5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
99. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 59.
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id. at 69 (Arabian, J. concurring and dissenting).
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2. Lucas' Lead Decision
In a lead decision authored by Chief Justice Lucas, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's de-
cision. 10 2 The court found the Gerstein holding to be limited
in scope, because Gerstein involved an adult defendant,
whereas Alfredo A. concerned a juvenile defendant. 10 3 The
court relied heavily on Schall v. Martin,10 4 a United States
Supreme Court case decided in 1984, which specifically ad-
dressed the question of pretrial detainment of juveniles.'0
In Schall, three juveniles were detained for more than
six days before appearing before a judge for a probable cause
hearing, in compliance with the applicable New York stat-
utes. '0 6 For juveniles detained upon arrest, the statutes pro-
vided for an initial appearance on the next court day or
within seventy-two hours, whichever came first.107 At this
appearance, which typically lasted five to fifteen minutes, the
judge did not ordinarily interview the juvenile, inquire into
the truth of the allegations stated in the petition, or make
any inquiry into whether there was probable cause to believe
that the juvenile committed the offense.108 The Schall Court
looked at the statutory scheme as a whole and concluded that
the lack of a requirement that factual probable cause be de-
termined at the initial appearance "[would] not, under the
circumstances, amount to a deprivation of due process." 10 9
In distinguishing the issue involved in Alfredo A. from
the situation in Gerstein, and arguing for the applicability of
the arguments posited in Schall, the California Supreme
Court noted:
102. Id. at 57, 69. The plurality held one portion of the statutory scheme
invalid. It struck down the statutory exception whereby detention could be ex-
tended if it occurred on a non-judicial day. The court stated that the Constitu-
tion requires that the juvenile be afforded a judicial determination of probable
cause within the initial seventy-two hours following arrest, even if the seventy-
two hour period immediately following arrest includes one or more judicial
days. Id. at 68-69.
103. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 58, 63 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 86 (1994).
104. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
105. Id. at 255.
106. Id. at 257-60. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 257 n.5.
108. Id. at 284-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275, 276 n.27 (1984).
1995] 703
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Whereas the sole issue in Gerstein was whether there was
factual probable cause to detain the adult arrestee pend-
ing further proceedings-i.e., the same standard as that
for arrest: "probable cause to believe the suspect has com-
mitted a crime"-Schall makes it abundantly clear that,
where juvenile detentions are concerned, such a factual
probable cause determination is but one component of the
broader inquiry implicated in the determination whether
to extend the pretrial detention of a juvenile arrested
without a warrant for criminal activity. 110
For similar reasons, the court was not persuaded that
McLaughlin should apply in the juvenile setting.'1 ' Because
it did not concern juvenile detentions, the McLaughlin Court
had no occasion to consider the fundamental necessity in the
administration of juvenile criminal justice systems to "strike
a balance-respect[ing] the 'informality' and 'flexibility' that
characterize juvenile proceedings .. . [while ensuring] that
such proceedings comport with the 'fundamental fairness' de-
manded by the Due Process Clause."" 2 As a result, the Al-
fredo A. court remained unconvinced that McLaughlin was
necessarily controlling in juvenile cases.
The court also cited Reno v. Flores"3 as authority for not
applying the McLaughlin standard in the juvenile system."14
In Flores, the United States Supreme Court rejected a proce-
dural due process claim of a class of alien juveniles. "I The
juveniles were detained because officials suspected the
youngsters could be subject to deportation."16 The rationale
advanced by the Flores Court echoed that of the Schall
Court." 7 Flores argued that juveniles do not have the same
rights as adults to be free from regulation over their move-
ment because "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some
form of custody.""' The holding in Flores served to reinforce
the California Supreme Court's belief that a bright line prob-
110. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 63 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994) (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 65-68.
112. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
113. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
114. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 65-67.
115. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 1439.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1447.
118. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993) (quoting Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)).
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able cause rule "does not, in isolation, adequately address all
of the constitutional concerns that arise in juvenile postarrest
detention cases." 119
3. Arabian's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Arabian argued that Lu-
cas' opinion erred in failing to analyze the claim in the con-
text of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as this was the sole
basis of petitioner's claim.120 Nonetheless, Arabian agreed
that McLaughlin was not necessarily controlling in the juve-
nile setting.12 ' Arabian then engaged in an examination of
the nature of the Fourth Amendment guarantee of prompt-
ness, with its qualification of reasonableness, in the context
of the particularized concerns of the juvenile justice
system. 122
Arabian conceded that the promptness requirement of
Gerstein applied to all warrantless detainees, regardless of
age. 123 However, he concurred with the rationale of Schall,
noting that the juvenile setting weighs heavily in determin-
ing whether and to what extent a constitutional protection
applies to minors. 1 24 Arabian concluded that the need for
maintaining flexibility when dealing with juvenile offenders
provided a "rational basis on which to premise some latitude
beyond the 48-hour limit delineated in McLaughlin."25
4. Mosk's Dissent
Justice Mosk dissented, arguing that the Gerstein
promptness requirement applied to juveniles and that the
McLaughlin definition of promptness was also binding on ju-
venile offenders. 126 Mosk noted that the Gerstein Court ex-
tended its promptness requirement to "persons" and "individ-
uals," and at no time attempted to limit or qualify its
119. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 66.
120. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 69 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994) (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 69-70.
123. Id. at 70.
124. Id. at 70-71.
125. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 71 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994).
126. Id. at 76-78 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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constitutional protection with regard to juveniles. 2 7 Using
reasonableness as the criterion for Fourth Amendment analy-
sis, Mosk argued, "[wihen probable cause is lacking, deten-
tion is unsupported as a matter of law. That proposition does
not depend on how old the detainee is. The presence of youth
does not make up for the absence of probable cause."128
Mosk's sentiment was clear: prolonged detention requires
probable cause.
After finding Gerstein's promptness requirement applica-
ble to juveniles, Mosk could not discern any basis on which to
restrict the McLaughlin holding from applying to
juveniles. 2 9 McLaughlin at no point limited its scope to
adults, nor did it qualify its applicability to juveniles.130 The
vagueness of Gerstein's promptness requirement, which had
spawned the McLaughlin holding, was no less vague in the
juvenile setting, and "will surely lead to like challenges in ju-
venile proceedings-of which the present is only the first-
involving the state judiciary as well as the federal in matters
that belong largely to the other branches of government."1"'
Mosk's dissent discounted Lucas' reliance on Schall1
3 2
and Flores' as not binding on Fourth Amendment ques-
tions, such as Aifredo A's.13 4 Schall was based on the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 13 5 while Flores was
based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 136
Mosk stated the court's long-standing belief that "[i]t is axio-
matic that cases are not authority for propositions not consid-
ered."13 7 Therefore, Mosk argued, Lucas had failed to sup-
port his position with authoritative precedent.
When viewed against the backdrop of reasonableness,
Mosk failed to see how it was reasonable to detain a juvenile
127. Id. at 76.
128. Id. at 77.
129. Id. at 77-78 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
130. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 77 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994).
131. Id. at 78.
132. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
133. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
134. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 78-80.
135. Schal, 467 U.S. at 255.
136. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 1439.
137. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 79 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Gilbert, 462 P.2d 580, 585
n.7 (Cal. 1969)).
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suspect longer than an adult suspect. 138 In addition, he
found Lucas' argument that the juvenile system's need for
flexibility necessitated longer detainment unavailing.1
39
While possibly conceding that the inquiry into the propriety
of extended detention with a minor suspect is broader in
scope than with an adult suspect, Mosk noted: "[tihat the 'in-
quiry' is 'broader' than probable cause is a result of the Legis-
lature's policy choice and not federal constitutional compul-
sion. But the fact remains: the 'inquiry' does indeed depend
on probable cause."1 40 The standard of probable cause, based
on reasonableness, does not change depending on whether
the suspect is an adult or juvenile. Consequently, Mosk ar-
gued that it was not any more reasonable to detain a juvenile
for a longer period of time than an adult.
1 41
III. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM
In holding that minors may be detained in excess of
forty-eight hours prior to a determination of probable cause
following a warrantless arrest, the California Supreme Court
decided that minors do not have the same Fourth Amend-
ment rights as adults in this area of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. The Alfredo A. court, while recognizing that the
guarantees of the protect juveniles, failed to state convinc-
ingly why juvenile suspects should be afforded less right to a
prompt pretrial determination of probable cause than that
given to adult suspects.1 42 The court's rationale rested
largely on the differences between the juvenile and adult
criminal systems, and the differing inquiries authorities must
make when determining whether a suspect should face pro-
longed detention. 143 The argument that, because the systems
are different, juveniles can be afforded different constitu-
tional rights is perfunctory and lacks solid legal principles
and articulable facts to support it. Nonetheless, such logic
has been used to deprive juveniles of their deserved Fourth
138. Id. at 81-82. As found in the text of the Fourth Amendment, reasona-
bleness is the standard against which detainments are to be judged constitu-
tionally permissible. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
139. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 82-83.
140. Id. at 83.
141. See supra note 137.
142. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 81-84 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 86 (1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 61-63.
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Amendment rights and could potentially be used to strip
juveniles of other constitutional protections.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Application of Precedent
1. Misguided Application of Precedent By Lucas
Chief Justice Lucas, writing for three members of the 4-3
plurality in Alfredo A., based his decision on the holding of
Schall v. Martin,144 in which juveniles were afforded different
constitutional protections than adults regarding pretrial de-
tention. 45 Lucas' reliance on Schall appears misplaced and
poorly chosen.
In Schall, the question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether section 320.5 of the New York Family
Court Act 146 satisfied the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 147 While recognizing the existence of the then-
current standard, enunciated in Gerstein, regarding Fourth
Amendment pretrial detainments, the holding of Schall was
based on due process grounds. 148 Lucas' application of Four-
teenth Amendment legal principles to the Fourth Amend-
ment question involved in Alfredo A.149 did not properly ad-
dress the legal question at issue.
Pretrial detainment can be held unlawful as a result of
violations of differing constitutional protections. It is not un-
usual for a freedom to receive protection from more than one
constitutional guarantee. For instance, a person subject to
criminal prosecution has a right to counsel protected by both
the Fifth Amendment1 50 and the Sixth Amendment.151 Like-
wise, a suspect detained on suspicion of criminal activity has
constitutional protections against unlawfully protracted de-
tentions under the Fourth, 152 Fifth,153 and Fourteenth
144. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
145. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 58.
146. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5 (McKinney 1983) (governing pre-trial detain-
ment of juveniles).
147. Schall, 467 U.S. at 253-54.
148. Id. at 263-81.
149. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 63-65 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 86 (1994).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Amendments. 5 4 Instances will occur when an action is law-
ful under one constitutional guarantee while unlawful under
another. For example, a suspect unwillingly deprived of
counsel during a custodial interrogation held prior to the ini-
tiation of criminal proceedings against him has not had his
Sixth Amendment rights155 violated, but has suffered a depri-
vation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.15 6 Depend-
ing on the facts of the case, a petitioner may argue that one or
more of these constitutional protections has been violated.
Once the petitioner makes the argument that a specific
constitutional right has been violated, it is the responsibility
of the respondent to refute that specific legal challenge. In
Alfredo A., petitioner argued that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated.' 57 He did not argue that his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights were violated. Nonetheless,
both the California Court of Appeal and the California
Supreme Court held that Alfredo A.'s detention was constitu-
tional because, in large part, his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment had not been violated.15 8  Both
courts failed to address the specific constitutional question
before them: whether the Fourth Amendment was violated as
a result of Alfredo A.'s detention in excess of forty-eight hours
without a showing of probable cause.' 59
2. Concurrence's Recognition of Lucas' Misapplication
of Precedent
In an opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Arabian
recognized Chief Justice Lucas' failure to properly address
the constitutional question at issue before the court.'6 0 While
believing that the McLaughlin standard was not "necessarily
controlling" in the juvenile setting, Justice Arabian rejected
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
155. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches once criminal judicial proceedings have
been instituted).
156. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
157. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 63 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994).
158. Id. at 60, 64-65, 68.
159. See id. at 69 (Arabian, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 69.
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Chief Justice Lucas' due process analysis. 16 1 Justice Arabian
agreed with the dissent in this regard, noting:
Petitioner does not dispute his postarrest detention [on
due process grounds]; nor does he raise such a challenge
to any provision of the Juvenile Court Law governing
wardship detentions in general. Rather, he asserts that,
like any adult in comparable circumstances, a detained
minor is entitled to a probable cause determination of sus-
pected criminal activity within 48 hours of a warrantless
arrest as mandated by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. As
framed by petitioner, the only issue before us is whether
the rule of McLaughlin applies to juveniles. Accordingly,
we are constrained to refract his contentions solely
through a Fourth Amendment prism, for that is the lim-
ited nature of his constitutional claim. The specificity of
the question demands an equally precise answer, not the
due process circuity submitted in the lead opinion.16 2
3. Dissent's Recognition of Lucas' Misapplication of
Precedent
Justice Mosk's dissent also perceived Lucas' misapplica-
tion of legal theory.'63  In concluding that the forty-eight
hour standard announced in McLaughlin was applicable to
juveniles and adults alike, Justice Mosk grounded his argu-
ments in Fourth Amendment precedent.' 64 He found that
the lead opinion had not based its position on Fourth Amend-
ment precedent and was "fatal[ly] flaw[ed]" as it was non-
responsive to the legal question at issue. 65 The question
before the court was whether the superior court's position
was correct, in that Gerstein's promptness requirement as de-
fined by McLaughlin was not applicable to juveniles and not
violative of the Fourth Amendment. 166 Instead, the lead
opinion addressed the question of whether the juvenile court
161. Id.
162. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 69 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994) (Arabian, J. concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
163. See id. at 79-81 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
164. Id. at 76-78.
165. Id. at 80.
166. Id.
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law complied with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as interpreted in Schall.
16 7
B. Proper Application of Precedent
Proper application of Fourth Amendment precedent to
Alfredo A.'s case should result in the same standard for a
probable cause determination for both juvenile and adult sus-
pects. The Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial de-
termination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint of liberty following a warrantless arrest.168
Juveniles are entitled to this protection.
169
When the United States Supreme Court decided Mc-
Laughlin, it clarified the vague standard of promptness.
1 70
This new standard was equally vague as it related to juvenile
proceedings. 17 Without clarification, the danger existed that
the practices of local law enforcement would violate Fourth
Amendment rights, including those of juveniles.
1. Neutral and Detached Magistrate
In California, the statutory scheme does not provide for
an appearance before a magistrate for up to seventy-two
hours after the minor is taken into custody. 172 Prior to ap-
pearing before a magistrate, the decision to keep the minor
detained lies within the discretion of the arresting officer and
a juvenile probation officer, 173 both of whom have direct or
indirect ties with law enforcement. For a proper implementa-
167. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 80 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994) (Mosk, J. dissenting). By applying specialized constitutional argu-
ments to a different consitutional claim, Justice Mosk noted that the lead opin-
ion could just as well have cited precedent to show that the statutory scheme
did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unsual
punishment. Id. This, however, would not respond to the question of whether
the statutory scheme violated the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Fur-
thermore, Chief Justice Lucas seemingly chops off the legal legs upon which his
opinion stands by noting the "limited precedential value" of applying special-
ized constitutional arguments to a different constitutional claim. Id. at 67.
168. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-16, 123-25 (1975).
169. E.g., R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1983); Cooley v.
Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Moss v. Weaver, 383 F. Supp. 130, 134
(S.D. Fla. 1974), aff'g in part, rev'd in part, 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976).
170. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1991).
171. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 77-78 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
172. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
173. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 602, 625, 628(a), 630(a), 631 (West
1987 & Supp. 1994).
1995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tion of Fourth Amendment protections, however, the United
States Supreme Court requires that the existence of probable
cause be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate
whenever possible.
174
The realities of law enforcement do not always permit an
officer the opportunity to obtain a warrant prior to an
arrest.175 Whereas the State's need for taking summary ac-
tion in combatting crime subsides once the suspect is de-
tained, the suspect's need to appear before a neutral and de-
tached magistrate for a determination of probable cause
increases dramatically.1
7 6
Consequently, following a warrantless arrest, the re-
quirement of a judicial determination of probable cause satis-
fies the Fourth Amendment by ensuring that the arresting
officer's judgment was correct in initially deciding to arrest
the suspect. The United States Supreme Court has explained
the need for a neutral and detached magistrate's determina-
tion of the existence of probable cause:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. 177
The danger of delaying or dispensing with the neutral and
detached magistrate's role in determining probable cause lies
in the prolonged detention with which the suspect is faced.
2. Seriousness of Detention
Alfredo A. and Schall asserted that the procedural safe-
guards found in the juvenile system which can require post-
arrest detentions in excess of forty-eight hours are in place to
protect juveniles. 78 In a footnote, the Schall Court even ar-
gued that brief delays in the probable cause hearing may be
174. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
175. See id. at 113 (stating that such a requirement would constitute an in-
tolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement).
176. Id. at 114.
177. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
178. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984); Alfredo A. v. Superior Court,
865 P.2d 56, 58 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994).
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beneficial to the detained juvenile, as the delay gives his
counsel additional time to prepare for the hearing. 179 Both
precedent and common sense refute this specious
argument.1 8
0
The freedom of liberty holds a prized place in the com-
mon law tradition upon which the laws of the United States
were founded. It is this freedom of liberty which exists at the
core of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable seizures of the person.
Gerstein noted the seriousness of pretrial detainment, in
stating that it could imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income and impair his family relationships.1 s In
addition, the consequences of prolonged detention may be
more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.1 8 2
The situation also proves serious for juvenile detainees. 183 In
fact, pretrial detention has been characterized as an "onerous
experience, especially for juveniles."1 8 4 The myth that the
conditions of juvenile detention are non-punitive and benign
"appears shaky when compared to the grim realities of incar-
ceration in some of today's overcrowded juvenile detention fa-
cilities."185 Justice George argued the following in his dissent
in Alfredo A.:
[T]he need for a very prompt judicial determination of
probable cause may be a more crucial factor in assessing
the "reasonableness" of the "seizure" of a juvenile than of
an adult, because the consequences of even a relatively
brief, wrongful incarceration are likely to be more detri-
179. Schall, 467 U.S. at 277 n.28.
180. It is reasonable to assume that legislatures allow sufficient time within
the statutory schemes for counsel to prepare adequately for a probable cause
hearing. For the juvenile to benefit from an additional delay, it would logically
follow that the statutory scheme is flawed in failing to provide an adequate
amount of time for counsel to prepare.
181. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
182. Id.
183. See Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial Detention of Juveniles:
A Principled Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 96
(1983) (noting that the overwhelmingly negative impact of pretrial detention on
juveniles often destroys any possibility of subsequent rehabilitation).
184. Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
185. David Steinhart, What Place for Troubled Youth?, THE RECORDER, Oct.
10, 1991, at 8.
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mental and long-lasting to an innocent, vulnerable child
than to an innocent adult.
1 8 6
By failing to give adequate recognition to the negative ef-
fects of pretrial detention on juveniles, the court skews its
calculus in balancing the juvenile's liberty interest with law
enforcement's need to control crime. 1 7 This skewing yields
an injustice for juveniles, whose prolonged detention is not
adequately warranted by a sufficiently urgent law enforce-
ment concern.
3. Prompt Determination of Probable Cause
No United States Supreme Court opinion has required
an immediate determination of probable cause following an
arrest.188 Nor has any United States Supreme Court opinion
required states to conform to uniform procedural steps in
their criminal justice systems.' 8 9 However, while Gerstein
did allow for states to tailor their pretrial procedures to the
states' wishes, it cautioned that "[w]hatever procedure a
State may adopt, it must provide a fair and reliable determi-
nation of probable cause as a condition for any significant
pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be
made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after
arrest." 90 In addition, Gerstein defined the promptness re-
quirement as "a brief period... to take the administrative
steps incident to arrest."' 91 Gerstein did not, however, allow
states to define the promptness requirement for themselves
and to choose pretrial procedures that would violate the
Supreme Court's federal constitutional mandate. 9 2 Since
McLaughlin defined the promptness requirement at forty-
eight hours, states must comply with its holding or violate
186. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 85-86 (Cal.) (George, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994); see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
291 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the impressionability of
juveniles may make the experience of incarceration more injurious to juveniles
than to adults).
187. See generally supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
188. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1991).
189. See id.
190. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975) (footnote omitted).
191. Id. at 114.
192. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 63-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 19 3
Because Alfredo A. allows probable cause determinations to
be held in excess of forty-eight hours following a warrantless
arrest, California fails to comply.
C. Forty-Eight Hours May Be Too Long
The forty-eight hour standard announced in McLaughlin
has been criticized as being too extended a period to detain a
suspect prior to a determination of probable cause.19 4 Mc-
Laughlin was a 5-4 decision, which implies that there was
hardly uniform agreement regarding the forty-eight hour
standard.195 One of the dissenters, Justice Scalia, urged the
application of a twenty-four hour standard. This view has
garnered considerable support in the legal community. 19 6
As Justice Scalia noted, every federal court that had ac-
tually set a time-limit for a probable cause determination
based on the time required to complete the steps incident to
arrest had selected twenty-four hours. 19 7 The American Law
Institute's Model Code requires that a suspect have an ap-
pearance before a court, where he or she could challenge
probable cause, at the earliest time after arrest that a judicial
officer of the court is available and, in any event, within
twenty-four hours. 198 In addition, the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure require that adult suspects be brought before
a magistrate "without unnecessary delay"199 and juvenile
suspects "forthwith."20 0
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. 295, 307 (1847)
(stating state courts are bound to conform to decisions of the United States
Supreme Court).
194. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59-71 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
195. Id. at 46.
196. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
197. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 68-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There was only
one exception found in the cases cited by Justice Scalia to the twenty-four stan-
dard. Id. This lone exception would not count Sunday within the twenty-four
limit. Id. at 69.
198. A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 310.1(1) (1975).
199. FED. R. CriM. P. 5(a).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1988).
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D. Precedent for Denying Juvenile Suspects Constitutional
Protections
The plurality in Alfredo A. and the majority in Schall
noted that the Constitution does not mandate elimination of
all differences in the treatment of juvenile and adult sus-
pects. 20 1 Both decisions cited only one case, McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania,20 2 to support this argument.20 3 In McKeiver,
the Court held that juveniles were not entitled to the right to
a jury trial.20 4 The Court reasoned that requiring jury trials
would "put an effective end" to some of the defining character-
istics of the juvenile system, namely that juvenile proceed-
ings are intimate, informal, and not fully adversarial.20 5 In
fact, requiring jury trials would eliminate many of the differ-
ences between the treatment of juvenile and adult suspects.
In contrast, granting juveniles the same treatment as
adults regarding a prompt showing of probable cause would
not tear at the fabric of the juvenile justice system. Neither
the character of the proceedings, nor the treatment of the
juveniles would be altered, as would occur with the require-
ment of jury trials. Only the amount of time allowed to elapse
prior to the probable cause hearing would be changed.20 6
E. Parens Patriae-Parental v. State Custody
Both Alfredo A. and Schall relied upon the parens patriae
doctrine in justifying juvenile detentions.20 8  In rational-
izing the detention of juveniles, Alfredo A. noted that
"juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of cus-
tody."209 This statement implies that a juvenile has a limited
liberty interest which can be subordinated to his custodian's
201. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 64 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 86 (1994).
202. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
203. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Aifredo A., 865 P.2d at 64.
204. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551.
205. Id. at 545.
206. The hope that counties could provide probable cause hearings for
juveniles within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest is entirely realistic.
The most heavily populated counties in California are already providing prob-
able cause hearings within forty-eight hours of a juvenile's arrest. See infra
note 242 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
208. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Alfredo A. v. Superior Court,
865 P.2d 56, 64 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994).
209. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 66 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 265).
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wishes. Although it is true that juveniles are in some form of
legal custody until they reach the age of majority or are
emancipated, the analogy between parental and state cus-
tody is unfair. In his dissent in Schall, Justice Marshall
argued:
[the] characterization of preventative detention as merely
a transfer of custody from a parent or guardian to the
State is difficult to take seriously. Surely there is a quali-
tative difference between imprisonment and the condition
of being subject to the supervision and control of an adult
who has one's best interests at heart.
210
There are three reasons to support Justice Marshall's ob-
servation of a qualitative difference in parental and state cus-
tody. First, there is a unique bond between parents and chil-
dren which the courts have recognized. 211 Natural family
ties and the affection that derives therefrom give parents
unique authority over their children.212 When custody of a
juvenile is transferred to the State, it cannot be presumed
that familial ties that lead a parent to act in the best interest
of their child will exist in the State-juvenile relationship.21 3
Furthermore, the state agent and juvenile are likely to be
strangers to one another. 214 As a result, it is not reasonable
to believe that the particular state agent will be as dedicated
to the juvenile's best interests as would the juvenile's parent.
Second, it cannot be assumed that the State is necessar-
ily looking out for the best interests of the child, as would a
parent, because of the inherent conflict of interest that exists
when the State acts in its parens patriae role. As such, the
State's goals are to provide guidance and rehabilitation for
the child, and to provide protection for society.2 15 These two
interests do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, they compete
against one another.216 It is not difficult to envision a scena-
rio where a state, due to public or political pressure to "get
tough on crime," acts in a manner conflicting with the best
interests of the child. There is no such conflict, however, with
210. Schall, 467 U.S. at 289-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. Worrell, supra note 74, at 180-81.
212. Id. at 180.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 181.
215. Id. at 176.
216. Id. at 181.
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the parent as custodian.2 1 7 Clearly, the parent's greatest re-
sponsibility is to care for the child and act in his best inter-
ests. Although it is a parental concern to keep a child from
harming the community, society has placed the primary re-
sponsibility for this task upon the State.2 18
Third, a qualitative difference exists between the condi-
tions that a juvenile faces during time spent in the custody of
the State, and the conditions a juvenile faces with a parent.
Instead of being with his family in the familiar surroundings
of his home, a juvenile is forced to endure a foreign environ-
ment where he is exposed to sexual assault,219 "penned like
cattle," and "often brutalized."220 These two experiences are
hardly equivalent. Furthermore, juveniles subject to deten-
tion suffer stigmatization as a result of their detention.2 2'
The damaging impact of detention on juveniles is recognized
by mental health professionals and the judiciary.222 As a re-
sult, the need for a prompt probable cause hearing once a ju-
venile is in custody is of great importance.
F. Probable Cause Hearing More Urgent for Juveniles
Than Adults
The Supreme Court first recognized that juveniles were
entitled to constitutional protections in In re Gault, where a
juvenile was held to be protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 3 In this case, the Court
held that a juvenile was entitled to written notice of the spe-
cific charges and factual allegations to be considered at a de-
217. Id. at 182.
218. Id.
219. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 290 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. Feld, supra note 74, at 202.
221. Schall, 467 U.S. at 291 (Marshall, J. dissenting). The California
Supreme Court has given the following characterization to what a juvenile
faces upon detention:
It is difficult for an adult who has not been through the experience to
realize the terror that engulfs a youngster the first time he loses his
liberty and has to spend the night or several days or weeks in a cold,
impersonal cell or room away from home or family.... The experience
tells the youngster that he is "no good" and that society has rejected
him. So he responds to society's expectation, sees himself as a delin-
quent, and acts like one.
In re M., 473 P.2d 737, 747 n.25 (Cal. 1970).
222. See supra notes 183-86, 219-21 and accompanying text.
223. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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linquency hearing.2 24 Today, the Court recognizes that many
constitutional protections enjoyed by adults also apply to
juveniles in juvenile proceedings.225 These protections in-
clude the right to counsel,2 26 the privilege against self-incrim-
ination,227 the right to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion,228 proof beyond a reasonable doubt,229 and protection
against double jeopardy.230 The Court, however, has not ex-
tended all constitutional protections to juveniles. 231
Differences in the rights afforded to juvenile and adult
suspects exist in California as well. Adult suspects generally
have the options of being released on their own recognizance
and posting bail.23 2 Neither of these alternatives is available
to juveniles in California.2 3 3 Consequently, juveniles have no
way of ending their detainment pending trial apart from a
probable cause hearing. The urgency in having a probable
cause determination, therefore, is arguably greater for
juveniles than for adults, who have means of gaining release
that are denied to juveniles. What could occur as a result of
this process is that:
a law-abiding juvenile wrongfully arrested may be com-
pelled to await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic
machine, as it churns its cycle for up to three days-never
once given the opportunity to show a judge that there is
absolutely no reason to hold him, that a mistake has been
made.234
Such a system casts a shadow over the criminal justice sys-
tem's core principle of innocent until proven guilty.
Fourth Amendment precedent does not support denying
a juvenile a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours
of a warrantless arrest. Furthermore, the deleterious effects
224. Id. at 31-34.
225. Id at 1.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
229. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
230. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
231. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (stating that juveniles
do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial).
232. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 82 (Cal.) (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 85 (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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of detention are particularly pronounced on juveniles.2"5 Pro-
longed pretrial detention subjects juveniles to extended expo-
sure to an unfriendly and dangerous environment, all the
while having no opportunity to prove their innocence.
Changes in the treatment of juvenile suspects in California
must cure this inequity.
V. PROPOSAL
Under the present system, juveniles may be held for sev-
enty-two hours prior to a hearing before a neutral and de-
tached magistrate without any showing of probable cause
that the juvenile has committed a crime. 236 The length of
this detention must be shortened to comply with the dictates
of Fourth Amendment precedent. Two alternatives exist to
remedy this injustice. One option entails reform through a
judicial decision; the other option requires statutory revision.
A. Apply the McLaughlin Forty-Eight Hour Standard
The first option would be to apply the same standard to
juveniles and adults alike, and require a showing of probable
cause within forty-eight hours to justify further detention of
the suspect.237 In doing so, the promptness requirement
stated in Gerstein and defined in McLaughlin would be ful-
filled and Fourth Amendment precedent satisfied. Neither of
these cases contain language excluding, or in any way limit-
ing, juveniles from the protections set forth in their hold-
ings. 23 8 Until the United States Supreme Court limits its
holding in McLaughlin to adults only, the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution23 9 requires that California
law yield to McLaughlin's holding, requiring probable cause
235. See Feld, supra note 74, at 200-03.
236. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
237. On May 31, 1994, petitioners in Alfredo A. filed for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56 (Cal.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994). This provided the Court with the op-
portunity to adopt the reform proposed by this comment. The Court, however,
denied certiorari. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994). As a re-
sult, the question of the applicability of McLaughlin to juveniles is yet to be
answered by the United States Supreme Court.
238. Alfredo A., 865 P.2d at 77-78 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
239. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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determinations for individuals within forty-eight hours of a
warrantless arrest.
240
Opponents to shorter time requirements for probable
cause determinations often argue that speeding up the crimi-
nal justice mechanism would be too costly, as it would re-
quire hiring additional police officers and magistrates.2 41
Cost certainly remains a valid concern. Nonetheless, a re-
view of statewide practices shows that the forty-eight hour
standard would not impose an unbearable burden on the ju-
venile criminal justice system. A number of the state's larg-
est counties, including San Diego, Orange, Santa Clara, Sac-
ramento, San Francisco, Fresno, and San Mateo, are already
successfully providing probable cause hearings within forty-
eight hours of warrantless arrest.24 2 By extending equal pro-
tection to juveniles and imposing the forty-eight hour stan-
dard on the pretrial detention of juveniles, the idea that the
system should protect persons who are presumed innocent
would be notably strengthened.
B. Statutory Revisions
Another option would be to change the criteria used by
officials in determining who should be detained. This could
simplify and expedite the process of determining which
juveniles should face pre-trial detention. In place of the cri-
teria stated in section 628(a) of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code,243 criteria should instead target the more
serious juvenile offenders and those who are at high-risk of
fleeing the jurisdiction pending a probable cause hearing.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has drafted stan-
dards for juvenile detention, which, if followed, would limit
the number of juveniles subject to preventative detention.244
240. See Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. 295, 308 (1847).
241. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
242. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 84 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86 (1994). At oral argument on rehearing,
counsel for respondent conceded that Los Angeles County was also successfully
providing probable cause hearings within the forty-eight hour period for most
juveniles. Id.
243. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 628(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); see supra
note 77.
244. INSTITUTE OF JuDIcIAL ADMINISTRATIoN/ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION
OF ACCUSED JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DIsPosITION, Standard
6.6 (1979). These standards require, as a prerequisite to juvenile detention
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The following proposed standards closely resemble those ad-
vocated by the ABA and should be adopted. The standard
would require that, as a prerequisite to juvenile detention
pending adjudication, the probation officer must find that the
juvenile fits into one of the following categories: 1) the juve-
nile is accused of a violent crime, which would be punishable
by a sentence of one year or more if committed by an adult
and which, if proven, would be likely to result in confinement
in a secure institution; or 2) the juvenile is an escapee from
an institution or other placement facility to which he or she
was sentenced under a previous adjudication of criminal con-
duct; or 3) the juvenile has a demonstrable recent record of
willful failure to appear at juvenile proceedings, on the basis
of which the official finds that no measure short of detention
can be imposed to reasonably ensure appearance; or 4) the
juvenile is verified to be a fugitive from another jurisdiction
which has formally requested that the juvenile be placed in
detention.24 5
The foregoing criteria are slightly more inclusive in
terms of the juveniles to be detained than the criteria put
forth by the ABA.246 Studies have shown that when strict
guidelines similar to those adopted by the ABA have been ad-
hered to, the results have been: 1) a significant decrease in
the number of juveniles detained; 2) a decrease in the length
of their detainment; 3) a decrease in the number of juveniles
rearrested on new charges; and 4) a minimal effect on the ju-
pending adjudication, that the juvenile, 1) be accused of a violent crime which
would be punishable by a sentence of one year or more if committed by an adult
and which, if proven, would be likely to result in confinement in a secure insti-
tution, and that one or more of the following additional factors is present: a) the
crime charged is a class one juvenile offense; b) the juvenile is an escapee from
an institution or other placement facility to which he or she was sentenced
under a previous adjudication of criminal conduct; or c) the juvenile has a de-
monstrable recent record of willful failure to appear at juvenile proceedings, on
the basis of which the official finds that no measure short of detention can be
imposed to reasonably ensure appearance; or 2) be verified as a fugitive from
another jurisdiction which has formally requested that the juvenile be placed in
detention. Id.
245. These standards bear some resemblance to section 635 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code which lists the standards the court applies at the
detention hearing itself to determine whether to continue the minor's detention
or order his or her release from custody. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 635 (West
1987 & Supp. 1994).
246. INSTITUTE OF JUDmciAL ADMINISTRATION/ABA, supra note 244, Standard
6.6.
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venile's appearance rate in court.2 4 7 If fewer juveniles are de-
tained for a shorter period of time and are rearrested less
often, the result would be monetary savings for law
enforcement.
These results could be achieved in California through im-
plementation of the above stated criteria. Adopting the crite-
ria suggested in this comment would eliminate the need for
probation officers to conduct time-consuming social work-like
investigations into the home-life of the juvenile, which neces-
sarily require a subjective determination to be made in de-
taining a juvenile suspect. Furthermore, by limiting the na-
ture of the inquiry, the criteria should enable the juvenile
system to complete their inquiry within the forty-eight hour
period required by McLaughlin.248
VI. CONCLUSION
In Alfredo A., the California Supreme Court refused to
extend to juveniles the right to a prompt showing of probable
cause within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest.
249 By
failing to extend equal Fourth Amendment protections to
juveniles in the context of pretrial detainment, the California
Supreme Court has marginalized juveniles' constitutional
rights. The Alfredo A. holding was not supported by Fourth
Amendment precedent, but instead by Fourteenth Amend-
ment cases. Fourth Amendment precedent must be applied
to cases like Alfredo A. When this is done, juvenile suspects
will receive Fourth Amendment protections equal to those
given adult suspects.
The realities of juvenile detention have not been ade-
quately considered in the calculus for determining the
amount of time permissible before a probable cause determi-
nation is required. The grim experience of detention in to-
day's overcrowded and often dangerous facilities is particu-
larly injurious to vulnerable and impressionable juveniles.
During this experience, the State assumes the role of the ju-
venile's custodian. The State, however, does not have the
same vested interest and concern for the juvenile's best inter-
247. James W. Brown et al., Preventive Detention After Schall v. Martin,
ABA PRACTCE PAPER SERIES (1985).
248. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).
249. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
86 (1994).
7231995]
724 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
ests as does the juvenile's parent. There is also a potential
conflict of interest with the State serving in its parens patriae
role, in protecting both the child and society, that is not pres-
ent with the juvenile's parent. Consequently, state custody
cannot legitimately be analogized to parental custody.
When courts interpret the Constitution to determine how
far Fourth Amendment protections are extended, the ques-
tion boils down to one of reasonableness. The seventy-two
hour standard enunciated by the Alfredo A. court strays from
the parameters of reasonable seizures as guaranteed under
the Fourth Amendment. A policy giving full efficacy to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment's language would re-
sult in a forty-eight hour standard for juveniles.
Richard S. Baum
